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Abstract
Recently, much research interest is directed towards the impact of migration on
the sending country. However, we think that this literature does not successfully
analyse migration effects on unemployment and wage rates especially in urban
areas. It studies the effect of one kind of migration flow, mainly international
migration, on labour market in the country of origin and shows that international
migration is able to reduce unemployment rate and/or raise wage rate. However,
it is common to find labour markets affected simultaneously by inflows and out-
flows of workers. Using a detailed CGE model applied to the Moroccan economy,
we show that if we take into account simultaneously Moroccan emigration to the
European Union, immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa into Moroccan urban ar-
eas and rural-urban migration, the impact on Moroccan urban labour market
disaggregated by professional categories is ambiguous.
Keywords: Imperfect labour market, Migration, Computable general equilib-
rium model.
JEL Classification: C58, F22, J44, J61, J64
1 Introduction
Analysing migration impact on Moroccan unemployment is an interesting ques-
tion. Unemployment, which represented less than 17% of the economic causes of
emigration before 1960, far behind the search for a more lucrative work (50%) or
the improvement of the standard of living (25%), became the principal economic
∗We thank Lionel Fontagne´ for excellent suggestions and fruitful discussions.
†Paris School of Economics, University Paris 1 & CNRS, Sorbonne Economic Center
(TEAM), 106-112 boulevard de l’Hoˆpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France; karam@univ-paris1.fr
‡Laval University, Economic Department, Pavillon J.-A.-DeSe`ve, Quebec, Canada G1K 7P4;
bernard.decaluwe@ecn.ulaval.ca
1
cause of emigration in the 1990s. According to the data collected by Hamdouch
et al. (2000), 41% of answers indicate unemployment as the first cause of emigra-
tion, whereas the search for a more lucrative work and the improvement of the
standard of living represent 38% and 14% respectively of the reasons for emigra-
tion. The relation between migration and economic development of the country
of origin has not been correctly addressed for a long time primarily because of
the scarcity of reliable data on migratory flows and migrants characteristics at
the macro and micro levels1. In the majority of the cases, studies have mainly
analysed the impact of migration on the country of destination2, and in very rare
occasions on the country of origin. Only a limited number of studies address the
impact of migration (directly or indirectly through remittances) on inequality and
wages, growth and welfare, its social effects (children health, education, women’s
role...), or the impact of returned migrants who acquired experience in the host
country and the relation between migration and trade3. The “brain drain” and
“brain gain” were also the issue addressed by several works.
The very few works that try to encircle in a systematic way the impact of
migration on labour market are limited to the effect of international migration
on unemployment in developing countries. However, it is common to find that
labour mobility is observed in several directions. For example, a transitory South-
South migration, from a developing country towards another before migrating to
a developed country, can coexist with an internal migration from rural to ur-
ban areas, or emigration to more developed countries. The combination of these
forces is able to exert unexpected effects on the labour market, and in order to
understand them and study their consequences, we choose the Moroccan case.
Indeed, Morocco seems the typical example of a developing country undergoing
the combination of different migratory flows: rural and urban emigration towards
the European Union, internal migration from rural to urban areas, and finally
Sub-Saharan immigration to Morocco for transit towards Europe or in order to
stay there definitely.
A sketchy analysis of the impact of these migratory flows on unemployment
and labour remuneration would lead us to conclude that on one hand, urban
emigration reduces urban unemployment rates and raises wages, whereas inter-
nal migration and Sub-Saharan immigration to the cities increase the pressure
on urban labour market. However, the simultaneous impact of these different
forces on labour market conditions cannot be predicted without ambiguity since
it will depend on the magnitude of each migratory flow and the initial condi-
tions of the labour market. If internal migration to urban areas and Sub-Saharan
immigration to Morocco dominate urban emigration, urban unemployment rate
1Fortunately, databases become increasingly available, like the one of Docquier and Marfouk
(2004) on brain drain.
2For a review of the literature on the effects of migration on the destination country, see
Drinkwater et al. (2003).
3For a review of the literature on the effects of migration on the country of origin, see Katseli
et al. (2006).
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must increase. Conversely, if urban emigration overrides internal migration and
Sub-Saharan immigration, unemployment rate will probably decrease.
In order to take the existing forces simultaneously into account, we build a
computable general equilibrium model. This method allows to endogenize the
principal determinants of migratory flows and thus to capture their simultaneous
direct effects on urban labour market, particularly on unemployment, and their
direct and indirect effects on the remainder of the economy. Contrary to other
studies on this question4, we do not think that an aggregate approach is sufficient
to seize the complexity of the existing mecanisms, and this is why we have privi-
leged a fine desaggregation by professional categories. This fine description of the
labour market which will take into account unemployment rates by professional
categories is justified by the fact that emigration and immigration do not affect
all categories in the same way. It will enable us to seize the impact of migration
on each segment of labour market.
The paper is structured in five sections. Section 1 is an introductory section.
Section 2 describes Moroccan labour market. Section 3 presents, in addition to
the general structure of the CGE model we have built, the principal character-
istics of migratory flows equations. Section 4 shows the results of a 10% fall in
migration costs, of a 10% rise of the Sub-Saharan immigrants stock, and finally,
the simultaneous effects of the two previous shocks. Section 5 concludes and
discusses the economic policy implications of this study.
2 Short description of the Moroccan labour market
Data from OECD (OECD 2006) indicate that the traditional destinations of
Morrocan international migrants such as Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, and the
Netherlands continue to receive important migratory flows. Thus, in 2004, 8,000
Morrocans entered to Belgium, 21,700 to France, 24,600 to Italy, 3,300 to the
Netherlands and 58,800 to Spain, with 21.5% of the foreign population living in
Spain in 2002. Moroccan Spanish represented the largest foreign community in
this country. Moreover and according to an opinion of the International Organi-
zation of Migration, Moroccan migration towards the European Union is mostly
originated from rural areas (Erf et al. 2002).
Concerning internal migration, climatic risks associated to agricultural pro-
duction induce farmers migration towards the cities. These rural workers search
for a stable employment in order to mitigate the fall or the great fluctuations
of their agricultural income. The available estimations indicate that each year,
approximately 200,000 migrants move into urban areas, which is equivalent to
40% of the total increase in urban population (Age´nor et al. 2003).
The extremely fast expansion of clandestine migration from Sub-Saharan
4See for example Age´nor et al. (2003).
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Africa since the beginning of the 90s is due to the fragility of this continent.
The exacerbation of poverty, the shortage of natural resources (water in particu-
lar) and conflicts and wars of any nature encourage African immigrants to transit
by Morocco in direction of Spain and Europe5 or to settle definitely in Morocco
in order to profit from its stability and prosperity. One of the more important
consequences of illegal immigration into Morocco is the fact that an increasingly
significant number of Sub-Saharan immigrants, scalded by the difficulties they
meet on the migratory way leading them to Europe, choose finally to stay in
different Moroccan localities (rather urban). Data on Sub-Saharan immigration
to Morocco are fragmentary and their collection is made difficult because the
majority of African immigrants are illegal. Lahlou (2003) pointed out that there
would be between 6,000 and 15,000 irregular migrants. We will retain the upper
bound.
Let us examine Moroccan labour market characteristics6. National employ-
ment is roughly equally distributed between rural and urban areas. In 2005,
urban employment constituted 50.5% of national employment. This percentage
varies slightly with respect to the previous years.
Table 1- Employment (%) by aggregate sectors of activity in 2005
Sectors National Rural Urban
Agriculture 45.5 80.2 5.2
Industry 12.4 3.9 22.3
Services 26 8.8 45.9
Construction 7.1 5.2 9.3
Public sector 9 1.9 17.3
Source: Department of Statistics, Rabat
The structure of employment by sectors of activity shows the relatively im-
portant weight of agriculture. In 2005, this sector, absorbing 45.5% of national
employment, predominates in rural areas, with 80.2% of total rural employment,
and is particularly based on family work. The services sector is ranked second
with 26% of national employment. However, it is the principal provider of urban
employment (45.9%). The industrial sector occupies only 12.4% of total employ-
ment (3.9% in rural areas against 22.3% in urban areas). The construction sector
employs 7.1% of total labour (9.3% in the cities and 5.2% in the campaigns).
5The transit by Morocco is explained by geographical reasons (Morocco being at 14 km of the
Spanish coast), by historical, sometimes cultural and religious reasons, and by socioeconomic
reasons like the possibility to work on spot during the long waiting periods or all along the
migratory way.
6The illustrative figures come from the survey of the Department of Statistics on activity,
employment and unemployment in 2005. The ventilation of employment between different pro-
fessional categories is taken from the Analytical Nomenclature of Professions established by the
Department of Statistics (2001).
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Employment opportunities come principally from the private sector. The latter
offers 91% of total employment at the national level (98% in rural areas and 83%
in urban areas). On the other hand, the public sector employs primarily towns-
men (17.3% of total employment in the cities against only 1.9% in the campaigns).
Table 2- Employment (%) by professional categories in 20057
Professions National Rural Urban
Directors... 0.8 0.1 1.6
Senior executive... 1.1 0 2.4
Junior staff 3.6 0.4 7.2
Employees 7.9 1.6 15.2
Commercants... 7.5 3.3 12.4
Farmers... 12.4 21.6 1.7
Craftsmen... 16.3 6.6 27.5
Workmen and farm labourers... 32.6 58.1 3.2
Drivers... 3 1.3 5
Warehousemen... 14.8 7 23.8
Source: Department of Statistics, Rabat
The distribution of Moroccan working population by professional categories
shows that at the national level, the most exerted profession is “workmen and
farm labourers”. The category “craftsmen and artisanal trades qualified workers”
comes in the second place followed by the category “warehousemen and workers
of small trades”. In rural areas, the category “workmen and farm labourers”
occupies the first place followed by the category “farmers, fishermen, foresters,
hunters and workers assimilate”, “warehousemen and workers of small trades”
and “craftsmen and artisanal trades qualified workers”. The examination of ur-
ban working population indicates that the share of the category “workmen and
farm labourers” is not more than 3.2%, and the category “craftsmen and artisanal
trades qualified workers” is henceforth ranked first followed by “warehousemen
and workers of small trades”, “employees” and “commercants, commercial and
financial intermediaries”.
In total, we display two segments of labour market: urban and rural, each one
composed of 10 under-segments of professional categories.
Table 3- National unemployment rate (%) by professional categories in
2005
7The exact headings of professions can be examined in Appendix.
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Professions Unemployment rates
Directors... 2.2
Senior executive... 1.7
Junior staff 6.1
Employees 11.2
Commercants... 3.2
Farmers... 0.3
Craftsmen... 10.1
Workmen and farm labourers... 2
Drivers... 8.5
Warehousemen... 12
Source: Department of Statistics, Rabat
As in many developing countries, unemployment in Morocco is primarily an
urban phenomenon. Unemployment rate rose in 1999 to 22% and diminished to
18.3% in 2005. In contrast, rural unemployment rate is not more than 3.6% in
2005. At the national level, unemployment rate reached 13.9% in 1999 but fall
to 11% in 2005. In addition, unpublished data provided by the Department of
Statistics show that the professions “warehousemen...”, “employees” and “crafts-
men and artisanal trades qualified workers” have the higher unemployment rates
(12%, 11.2% and 10.1% respectively). On the other hand, “farmers...” and “se-
nior executive...” exhibit the lowest rates (0.3% and 1.7% respectively).
3 Theoretical framework
If we wish to analyse correctly the impact of migration on the different segments
of labour market, it will be important to identify the origin of migratory flows.
Thus and if one can think that Moroccan emigration from rural or urban areas
will relax the pressure on the corresponding domestic labour markets, the drop
in labour supply in the countryside or the city will induce a rise in rural or urban
wages. Given that unemployment is an important characteristic of urban larbor
market, emigration of urban workers, when it touches mainly some professional
categories, will obviously reduce unemployment rates for these categories and not
for the others if there is some degree of specificity of the qualifications. On the
contrary, migration of rural workers towards cities and the entry into urban areas
of African immigrants increase labour supply and can lead to a rise in unemploy-
ment rates of the different professions. Since emigration and immigration do not
touch the same categories, their impact will be different from a market to an-
other. It is also clear that the eventual labour surplus on some segments of labour
market will reduce wages (freely fixed by the market or negotiated by the means
of a wage convention). When these migratory flows coexist, the ultimate effect
on urban unemployment rates by professional categories is ambiguous. In order
to understand these effects, a fine modelisation of labour market, illustrative of
all these migratory movements, is necessary. The remainder of this section will
describe the behavioural assumptions we retained.
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Our benchmark computable general equilibrium model is a standard one in-
spired from the model of Decaluwe´ et al. (2001) developed by Cockburn et al.
(2006). This basic structure will however be deeply modified in order to describe
adequately the behaviour of labour market and the internal and external deter-
minants of migratory flows. Very briefly, our version of this model contains 34
monoproducive sectors distributed between two aggregate sectors: a rural sec-
tor (agriculture and fishing) and an urban sector (industry, tradable services and
non tradable services); two factors of production (a labour factor bundle of differ-
ent professional rural/urban categories mobile between rural/urban sectors and
a capital factor specific for each sector); five agents (rural and urban households,
firms, government, and the Rest of the World). Then, we proceed by a special
treatment of the rural sector. We distinguish within this sector between subsis-
tence agriculture and industrial agriculture. Given the relative complementarity
of capital and labour within the public value added, the latter is modeled using
a Leontief function, contrarily to private value added represented by a CES8. We
endogenize labour supply on each segment of labour market and we take into
account unemployment rates by professional categories. We further assume that
unemployed persons can not change their profession. In other words, the cross
elasticity of labour supply should be null. Finally, we introduce a new block of
equations relative to rural and urban emigration, to internal migration from rural
to urban areas and to Sub-Saharan immigration, and we suppose the existence
of migration costs. Our model is calibrated on the SAM of the year 1998.
We detail only the explanation of the equations added to the benchmark
model. All equations of the model can be examined in Appendix.
3.1 Migratory flows
3.1.1 Migration costs
When an individual or a household migrates from a region to another or when he
decides to leave his country, this can not be done without costs. Any migratory
movement induces financial costs (travel cost, search for an apartment, search for
a job...) and psychological costs (change of the way of life, adaptation to a new
culture and a new community...) for the migrant. In order to express migration
costs, we adopt the approach proposed by Chan et al. (2005): when workers
migrate from a region to another due to wage differentials, their net wage in the
region of destination is lower than the effective wage in this region, where the
difference represents migration costs. To seize this phenomenon, the authors con-
sider that this gap is equivalent to a reduction in household’s available time to
work and results in a reduction of his labour endowment. In other words, migra-
tion costs is a fraction of the migratory flow. For lack of precise information on
the width of this cost, we follow Chan et al. (2005) who postulate that migration
8Constant Elasticity of Substitution.
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costs are equal to 10% of the migratory flow. Given that migrants labour supply
in the region of destination is reduced of 10%, total labour remuneration of their
work decreases too. In the dynamic version of the model, these costs are brought
to decrease gradually during the first periods and vanish thereafter.
We neglect adjustment costs associated with Sub-Saharan immigration because
we suppose that the latter is exogenous and not motivated by economic factors.
Indeed, according to Lahlou (2003), political factors (disorders and conflicts be-
tween and inside several African countries) and lawful factors (Schengen space)
stimulate illegal African immigration to Morocco. Thus, migration towards Mo-
rocco takes place whatever migration costs fall down or not.
3.1.2 Internal and international migration from rural areas
Two types of migratory flows take place from rural areas: internal migration
towards the cities and international migration. In 1960, more than 70% of Mo-
roccans lived in rural zones. Four decades later, they are not more than 46% due
to internal migration from rural areas to cities and to foreign countries. Migra-
tion phenomenon seems originated mainly from rural areas. The gap between
annual growth rates of rural and urban populations, which was around 2.5% in
1960 (4.2% in urban areas against 1.7% in rural areas), rose to more than the 3%
in the 90s. Moreover, in 1997, the growth rate of rural population was negative
(Erf et al. 2002).
In order to characterise this migratory movement, we postulate that the rural
worker of professional category c carries out a choice in two stages: initially,
he maximizes his expected income considering the choice of staying in Morocco
(staying in rural zones or migrating to the cities) or leaving the country9:
Max REVc = wncNATc + wice(1−mc)EMRc
subject to
LSRc = Brc[$cNAT (εc−1)/εcc + (1−$c)EMR(εc−1)/εcc ]εc/(εc−1) (1)
where
wnc is the national wage rate of professional category c,
NATc Moroccan rural workers of category c having decided to stay in
Morocco,
wic the international wage rate of category c in foreign currency,
e the nominal exchange rate,
mc migration costs expressed as a pourcentage of the migratory flow,
EMRc the flow of Moroccan rural emigrants of category c,
LSRc the rural population of category c,
εc the elasticity of transformation (negative).
9Given that in CGE models we analyse the behaviour of a representative agent, NATc and
EMRc correspond to the number of hours that the representative worker of category c chooses
to offer respectively in Morocco and abroad.
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The percentage of rural emigrants is deduced from the optimisation problem:
EMRc
NATc
= [
$c
1−$c
wice(1−mc)
wnc
]−εc (2)
In the second stage, the rural worker of category c who has decided to stay
in Morocco carries out the choice of staying in rural areas or migrating to a city.
The potential internal migrant compare a rural job to an urban one belonging to
the same professional category. Thus, labour supply of each professional category
does not depend on the wage of the other categories. However, when he takes
the decision to migrate to urban areas, he is aware of the possibility not to find
a job there. Therefore, the expected urban wage of category c is equal to the
urban wage of this category times the probability to find a job in town. This
probability is itself equal to the ratio of total urban labour demand of category c
and total labour supply:
wac = wugc
∑
up LUc,up +
∑
pub LGc,pub
NATUc + (1−mc)MIGc + IMMIGc (3)
where
wugc is the average urban wage rate of professional category c,
LUc,up the urban labour demand of category c by urban private sector up,
LGc,pub the urban labour demand of category c by urban public sector pub,
NATUc Moroccan urban workers of category c having decided to stay in
urban areas
MIGc migrants of category c from rural to urban areas,
IMMIGc the stock of African immigrants of categoy c.
The maximization problem of this potential internal migrant is written as
follows:
Max REVc = wac(1−mc)MIGc + wrcNATRc
subject to
NATc = Buc[ϑcNATR(%c−1)/%cc + (1− ϑc)MIG(%c−1)/%cc ]%c/(%c−1) (4)
where
wrc is the rural wage rate of professional category c,
NATRc Moroccan rural workers of category c having decided to stay in rural
areas,
%c the elasticity of transformation (negative).
The percentage of rural migrants to urban areas is then written:
MIGc
NATRc
= [
ϑc
1− ϑc
wac(1−mc)
wrc
]−%c (5)
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The elasticity of transformation is, in absolute value, lower in equation (2)
than in equation (5), reflecting a much stronger preference of workers for their
country of origin. This is due to higher costs associated to migration abroad.
3.1.3 Migration from urban areas
At his turn, the urban worker maximizes his income by choosing to stay in Mo-
rocco or to migrate abroad. Given that urban markets are imperfect, the urban
worker is unable to offer all his disposable working hours. He is considered unem-
ployed for the hours he can not offer. Therefore, to make his choice, he compares
the international wage to the urban expected wage and solves the following max-
imization problem:
Max REVc = wacNATUc + wice(1−mc)EMUc
subject to
LSUc = Bic[ξcNATU (oc−1)/occ + (1− ξc)EMU (oc−1)/occ ]oc/(oc−1) (6)
where
EMUc represents Moroccan urban workers of category c who decided to
emigrate,
LSUc the urban population of category c
oc the elasticity of transformation (negative).
The percentage of Moroccan urban workers of category c choosing to leave
their country is given by:
EMUc
NATUc
= [
ξc
1− ξc
wice(1−mc)
wac
]−oc (7)
Note that the elasticity of transformation oc is greater, in absolute value, than
the one of equation (2), reflecting less financial constraint for urban workers to
migrate abroad, compared to rural workers. It is however lower than the one of
equation (5) because the costs associated to internal migration are lower than
those associated to international migration.
3.1.4 African immigration
To take into account the characteristics of the African immigrant, we suppose
that, when he comes to stay in Moroccan cities, he does not have the same be-
haviour of the Moroccan urban worker. He does not maximize his income by
choosing to offer his work in Morocco or abroad. He comes to work in Morocco,
fleeing war or poverty, in order to stay there definitely or to survive before mi-
grating to Spain. The decision to migrate towards Europe is taken before the
arrival to Morocco, and thus does not depend on the living conditions and on
wage differential between Morocco and the Rest of the World. Moreover, given
that African immigration does not only occur for economic or financial reasons,
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but also for personal and security reasons, living conditions in Morocco and in
particular urban wage variation will not affect Sub-Saharan immigration towards
Morocco. For this reason, we choose to exogenize the stock of African immigrants
in Morocco. This variable will be subject to a shock later on, a 10% rise of the
stock of Sub-Saharan immigrants, in order to study how exogenous causes such
as the exacerbation of poverty or conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa can exert strong
pressures on the Moroccan economy.
In addition, the majority of these immigrants are not qualified, and if they
are, they do not occupy qualified jobs in Morocco (shoe-makers, mason assistant,
guards of private residences...). Therefore, we also assume that these African
immigrants will occupy jobs of weak qualification. They will belong to the urban
category “warehousemen and workers of small trades”. Moreover, these immi-
grants are not perfectly substitutable to local labour. The majority of them being
clandestine, they can only work in the informal sector. Thus, a company that
employs workers belonging to the above category does not pay social security
contributions on the wages assigned to African immigrants, contrary to nationals
belonging to the same category. Urban labour demand of category “10” (“ware-
housemen and workers of small trades”) by urban private sector up is a CES
function of national and foreign workers. Relative demand of foreign workers is
deduced from the wage cost minimization problem of sector up:
Min wupupLU“10”,up = (1 + cs)wu“10”NATIup + wu“10”ETRup
subject to
LU“10”,up = Aiup[ΩupNATI
(ςup−1)/ςup
up + (1− Ωup)ETR(ςup−1)/ςupup ]ςup/(ςup−1) (8)
where
wupup is the average wage of category “10” in sector up, given by the
following equation:
wupup =
(1 + cs)wu“10”NATIup + wu“10”ETRup
LU“10”,up
LU“10”,up the urban labour demand of category “10” by private urban sector up,
cs social security contributions,
wuc the private urban wage of category c,
NATIup the demand of domestic workers belonging to category “10” by sector
up,
ETRup the demand of foreign workers belonging to category “10” by sector
up,
ςup the elasticity of substitution between nationals and immigrants in
sector up (positive).
This elasticity can be interpreted as a parameter of “repression” reflecting the
fear of the firm from being punished for having engaged informal Sub-Saharan
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workers. The weaker the elasticity is, the more the repression is strong and less
the firm will change the proportion of domestic and foreign workers after the
variation of their relative wages. Conversely, more the elasticity is strong, more
the repression is laxist and more the firm will be incited to engage Africans when
their relative wage decreases. The parameters of distribution Ωup and (1− Ωup)
are then interpreted as parameters of “tolerance”, which are the proportions of
nationals and Sub-Saharan immigrants socially accepted for a given level of the
parameter of “repression”.
Relative demand for Sub-Saharan labour is therefore written:
ETRup
NATIup
= [(
(1− Ωup)
Ωup
)(
wu”10”(1 + cs)
wu”10”
)]ςup (9)
Social security contributions cs are fixed to 20% of the private urban wage of
each professional category. The employer pays 18,6% of the gross salary to the
Social Security for contributions to retirement and other social security covers,
and an obligatory tax of 1.6% imposed on the wage bill as a contribution to the
financing of the public system of vocational training.
Therefore, social security contributions create a gap between wages paid by
firms and labour remuneration received by households and the Rest of the World.
They are modeled explicitly in the urban private sector and in industrial agricul-
ture. On the other hand, we assume that they are null in subsistence agriculture
where a significant part of labour comes from family work. In addition, they are
neglected in the public sector because if they are paid by public firms, they are
received by the agent “government” which is constituted of the Central Govern-
ment and public firms.
3.2 A particular treatment of the rural sector
We distinguish, within the rural sector, two types of agriculture: subsistence
agriculture and industrial agriculture. This modeling agrees perfectly with the
reality of Moroccan agriculture of which a considerable share is for subsistence10.
With agricultural production directed towards the domestic market, the subsis-
tence sector satisfies consumers final demand and its production is not used as
an intermediary input in other industries. By opposition, industrial agriculture
delivers intermediary inputs to industrial and food processing industries. It is
10By definition, subsistence agriculture (also known as self sufficiency) is a method of farming
in which farmers plan to grow only enough food to feed the family farming, pay taxes, and
perhaps provide a small marketable surplus. This definition is problematic because when the
production is intended to feed the family, it will not be offered on the domestic market and there-
fore will not enter national statistics. Here, we mean by subsistence agriculture the production
of foodstuffs that uses traditional production techniques and is offered on the domestic market
in order to satisfy the representative consumer demand and not only peasants’ consumption.
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intended to domestic and international markets and resorts to production tech-
niques different from subsistence agriculture (transport, storage, conditioning,
quality control...). The fishing sector is associated to industrial agriculture be-
cause Moroccan fishing is primarily industrial: domestic consumption remains
very weak and is only around 6 kg/person. The canning facility corresponds to
one third of pelagic catches, the remainder being intended to flour and fish oil
production. We will also assume that subsistence agriculture uses only labour for
production, whereas industrial agriculture uses labour and capital.
As it is known, the history of Moroccan agriculture is marked by frequent pe-
riods of dryness and extreme pluviometric fluctuations. The successive drynesses
in 1981, 1983 and 1984 induced a negative growth rate of agricultural production
(-1,9% on average). Such periods are heavy on the peasants who live from land
and do not have other incomes11. Often, they will be obliged to move in order to
seek a job allowing them to mitigate the fall of their agricultural income.
What will be the impact of these variations of rural working population on
agricultural production? In principle, production should be done in the zone of
decreasing marginal productivity of the mobile factor (to the right of the inflec-
tion point in figure 1). However one can think that it is not necessarily the case.
Indeed, given that the departure of peasants into urban areas increases agricul-
tural properties (for example after the sale of lands by leaving peasants) or leads
to the abandonment of less productive pieces, the variations of rural working
population can drive us to the left of our inflection point, which is a zone where
marginal labour productivity is increasing. In the same way, the opposite move-
ment of eventual comeback of urban workers to rural areas could lead to a fall in
agricultural marginal productivity because of land bursting or the exploitation
of more arid and less productive zones.
In order to model this phenomenon and to allow a change of regime (to pass
from a situation of increasing productivity to a situation of decreasing produc-
tivity) after the migratory movements between rural and urban areas, we adopt
for subsistence agriculture a value added function of the Weibull type12:
V A“av” = a(1− e−(LDR“av”/b)f ) (10)
represented by figure 1.
Subsistence agriculture value added being created only by labour, we can
11Certainly, transfers from internal and international migrants to their family in rural areas
can compensate for the loss of their agricultural income. However, given that transfers are not
only allocated to consumption but also to investment, this requires a dynamic CGE model and
not a static one, as it is the case of our model.
12This is not possible with a CES function which models a productivity either increasing, or
decreasing, but not both at the same time.
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Figure 1:
write labour demand by this sector in the following form:
LDR“av” =
PV“av”V A”av”
w“av”
(11)
In other words, and contrary to industrial agriculture, all the profits of this sector
are incorporated in labour remuneration.
The parameter f is fixed to 2.2814, which corresponds to a symmetric func-
tion. In order to calibrate the parameters a and b, we must make a assumption
about the volume of labour corresponding to the inflection point. For that, let us
postulate that, before any migratory movement from rural areas, labour marginal
productivity is decreasing. Once rural workers leave the countryside towards ur-
ban areas or abroad, we suppose that labour demand by subsistence agriculture
corresponds to the inflection point of figure 1.
3.3 The public sector
Contrary to production functions characterising private firms behaviour that
choose the volume of labour and capital in order to maximize their profits, we
postulate that the value added of non tradable public services is a “Leontief” com-
bination of the two factors of production. Indeed, the government as a producer
of services does not have an optimisation behaviour. Thus, for each job created in
the public sector, the government must mobilize some quantity of capital (public
buildings, etc...) and add this cost to the remuneration of civil servants. The
value added in the public sector is then written:
V Apub = KDpub/kpub (12)
where
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V Apub is the value added of public sector pub,
KDpub capital demand by public sector pub,
kpub the technical coefficient of the Leontief value added function.
Moreover, we will assume that the government needs a constant proportion
of each professional cactegory. Therefore, if the wage of engineers increases, it
cannot replace them by office workers. By postulating that labour demand of
category c by the public sector is insensitive to the variation of relative wages,
we can express total labour demand by non tradable public services as a Leontief
function of labour demand by professional categories, that is to say:
LGc,pub = LDGpublcc,pub (13)
where
LGc,pub is labour demand of category c by public sector pub,
LDGpub labour demand by public sector pub,
lcc,pub the technical coefficient of the Leontief public labour demand function.
In tradable sectors, firms maximize their profits. Then, if the capital available
is sectoral specific, the profit or capital remuneration is residual and varies from
a sector to another. This approach is obviously irrelevant in the public sector
since the government, as a supplier of non tradable services, does not have an
optimisation behaviour. The cost and thus the price of public services is then the
result of the combination of wage and capital costs. Consequently, we normalize
the rental rate of capital in the public sector and we calculate capital demand in
the following way:
KDpub =
PVpubV Apub − wpubLDGpub
rpub
(14)
where
KDpub is capital demand by public sector pub (endogenous),
PVpub the value added price of public sector pub,
wpub the wage of public sector pub given by the following equation:
wpub =
∑
c
LGc,pubwgc
LDGpub
(15)
wgc is the public wage rate of professional category c,
rpub the rental rate of capital in public sector pub.
The level of employment in the public sector LDGpub and the public wage by
professional category wgc are considered exogenous.
According to the World Bank (2002), monetary compensations in the pub-
lic sector are, in Morocco, 8% higher than in the private sector. If we add to
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that nonpecuniary compensations, like job security and the existence of generous
pension funds, the divergence between the public and private sectors becomes
larger. According to the National Survey on Households Living Standards in
1998-1999, this corresponds to a public wage of 1.5 to 2 times higher than private
sector wage. The existence of an important wage differential between the pub-
lic and private sectors leads necessarily to a labour surplus in the public sector
and, in particular for young and qualified people, waiting unemployment and a
high reservation wage. Hence, we take into account this wage differential in the
calibration procedure by postulating that:
wgc  wuc (16)
3.4 Endogenization of labour supply by professional categories
The assumption of a representative agent usually used in the literature on CGE
models is not without posing conceptual difficulties when it is applied to the
household agent. Indeed, incomes and in particular labour incomes of this “house-
hold” come from the participation of a multitude of individuals to different labour
markets. In our model, wage rates are different between categories and the in-
crease in the wage rate of a professional category does not induce necessarily a
fall in labour supply of another category. In other words, the concepts of cross
elasticities loose their significance when the representative agent is composed of
individuals having different qualifications.
In order to solve this problem, Decaluwe´, Lemelin, Bahan and Annabi (2005)
proposed to describe each representative household as a group of individuals, each
one belonging to a professional category and exerting only one profession. Each
individual of this group maximizes its utility independently of the others, taking
into account its own preference for leisure. Thus, labour supply of each member
(or each professional category) is independent from the wage rate of the other
members (or categories) and thus the opportunity cost of leisure differs between
members. This approach is similar to a particular case of the collective household
model (Chiappori 1992) where the decision process is carried out in two stages:
initially, income - here non labour income - is divided between household mem-
bers. Then, each member maximizes his utility independently from the others.
We follow this approach and postulate that the individual carries out an ar-
bitration between the time allocated to work and the time allocated to leisure.
Given that leisure is considered as a normal good, its opportunity cost is equal,
in presence of unemployment, to the expected wage rate of the corresponding
professional category, which is the product of the wage rate by the probability of
being employed. In other words, we suppose that unemployment on urban labour
market c affects proportionally all individuals who offer this type of work. When
the expected wage increases, an income effect and a substitution effect come into
play. On one hand, the rise in wage rate increases the leisure opportunity cost,
and therefore the individual raises his labour supply. This is the substitution
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effect. On the other hand, the rise in wage rate induces an increase in the con-
sumption of all goods, including leisure (a normal good), and consequently a fall
in labour supply. This is the income effect. The final effect on labour supply
depends on the extent of the two effects: if the substitution effect dominates,
the labour supply curve is increasing. If the income effect is greater than the
substitution effect, the labour supply curve is decreasing. It is called “Backward-
bending” (Hanoch 1965). It will have the form of figure 2. For our simulations,
we will assume that the substitution effect dominates and that the labour supply
curve has a positive slope.
The consumer carries out initially the choice between goods consumption and
leisure consumption, using a ELES function13. In order to define the optimisation
problem of household member c using a Stone-Geary utility function, it is neces-
sary to separate between household members the minimum level of consumption
of each good and service i as well as the non labour income. Let λc be the share
of household member c, with
λc =
wc
∑
j LDc,j∑
c (wc
∑
j LDc,j)
and
∑
c
λc = 1.
The optimisation problem of household member c is written:
Max Uc =
∑
i
mi,cln(Ci,c − λcCmini) + βcln(TNLc − TNLminc)
13Extended Linear Expenditure System (Lluch 1973). The ELES demand function is obtained
from a static maximization problem of the Stone-Geary function, considering savings as a good
with a null minimum consumption. In our problem of labour supply endogenization, we replace
savings by leisure and we consider that the household must also consume a minimum level of
leisure (De Melo and Tarr 1992, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980).
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subject to
∑
i
PCiCi,c = (1− ψ)(1− ty × adj)wc
∑
j
LDc,j +
λc(1− ψ)(1− ty × adj)[Y −
∑
c
(wc
∑
j
LDc,j)]
= prlc(Tc − TNLc) + λc(1− ψ)(1− ty × adj)[Y −
∑
c
(wc
∑
j
LDc,j)]
where
Uc is household member c utility,
mi,c the budgetary share of good i in the supernumerary income of member c,
Ci,c member c consumption of good i,
Cmini the minimum consumption of good i,
βc the leisure share in member c income,
TNLc the leisure time of member c,
TNLminc the minimum leisure time of member c,
PCi the composite price of good i,
ψ the marginal (and average) propensity to save applied uniformly to all household
members,
ty the direct tax rate on household income applied uniformly to all household
members,
adj a compensatory tax,
wc the wage of professional category c,
LDc,j labour demand of professional category c by sector j,
Y the integral income of the representative household,
prlc the leisure opportunity cost of member c given by:
prlc = (1− ψ)(1− ty × adj)(1− uc)wc
uc the unemployment rate of professional category c,
Tc the total available time for member c,
The equations of goods and services demand and leisure demand become:
Ci,c = λcCmini +
mi,c
(1− βc)PCi (
∑
i
PCiCi,c −
∑
i
PCiλcCmini) (17)
and
TNLc = TNLminc +
βc
(1− βc)prlc (
∑
i
PCiCi,c −
∑
i
PCiλcCmini) (18)
From the equality TNLc−TNLminc = lsmaxc−LS, where lsmaxc is household
member c maximum time available to work, and from equation (18), we deduce
the labour supply function of professional category c:
LSc = lsmaxc − βc(1− βc)prlc (
∑
i
PCiCi,c −
∑
i
PCiλcCmini) (19)
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In the three previous equations, we replace
∑
i PCiCi,c by its value given in the
optimisation problem.
Because we are taking into account two segments of labour market, rural
and urban, each one divided in ten under-categories according to the different
professional categories, we distinguish two equations of labour supply, one for the
rural market applied to all rural professions and one for the urban market applied
to all urban professions:
NATRc = lsmaxc − βc(1− βc)prlc (
∑
i
PCiCi,c −
∑
i
PCiλcCmini,“hr”) (20)
where∑
i
PCiCi,c = (1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr”adj)wrc
∑
ru
LRc,ru +
λc(1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr”adj)[Y“hr” −
∑
c
(wrc
∑
ru
LRc,ru)](21)
in rural areas and:
NATUc = lsmax′c −
β′c
(1− β′c)pluc
(
∑
i
PCiC
′
i,c −
∑
i
PCiλ
′
cCmini,“hu”) (22)
in urban areas14, where∑
i
PCiC
′
i,c = (1− ψ“hu”)(1− ty“hu”adj)(wuc
∑
up
LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub
LGc,pub) +
λ′c(1− ψ“hu”) × (1− ty“hu”adj)[Y“hu” −
∑
c
(wuc
∑
up
LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub
LGc,pub)](23)
Now, rural household demand of good i is written:
CTi,“hr” = Cmini,“hr” +
∑
c
mi,c
(1− βc)PCi (BC“hr” −
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hr”) (24)
and urban household demand:
CTi,“hu” = Cmini,“hu” +
∑
c
m′i,c
(1− β′c)PCi
(BC“hu” −
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hu”) (25)
14The representative urban household agent is made of Moroccans having decided to stay
in urban areas but also of rural migrants towards the cities and of Sub-Saharan immigrants
whose labour income is added to the integral income of the representative household and is used
for consumption and savings ends. For lack of information on the consumption behaviour of
the latters, we postulate that these individuals, once in urban areas, have the same behaviour
in terms of consumption of goods and leisure that urban Moroccans belonging to the same
professional category. In other words, a fraction of their labour supply is made endogenous
because it depends on the professional category leisure price. It is incorporated in NATUc.
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where BC“hr” et BC“hu” are respectively rural and urban households consump-
tion budgets.
For lack of data on consumption and income elasticity of household members
that are necessary to calibrate the budgetary share of each one of them, we
suppose, as in Decaluwe´ et al. (2005), that all household members distribute
their supernumerary consumption budget in the same proportions, whatever their
leisure budgetary share is. In other words, the fractions
mi,c
(1− βc) and
m′i,c
(1− β′c)
are the same between all members of rural and urban households, they are inde-
pendent of the professional category to which the individual belongs. Thus, rural
household demand of good i is written:
CTi,“hr” = Cmini,“hr” +
γi,“hr”
PCi
(BC“hr” −
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hr”) (26)
and urban household demand:
CTi,“hu” = Cmini,“hu” +
γi,“hu”
PCi
(BC“hu” −
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hu”) (27)
3.5 Labour markets equilibrium
In Morocco, like in the majority of developing countries, unemployment is a
characteristic phenomenon of urban labour market. Therefore, a realistic repre-
sentation of this market must take unemployment into account in equilibrium, in
contrast with the bulk of the CGE literature.
We rely here on a Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) type approach. Using in-
ternational microeconomic data on more than twelve nations, Blanchflower and
Oswald identified a negative relation between wage rate and unemployment rate
implying that, other things equal, if the unemployment rate of a particular re-
gion increases during a year, the corresponding workers will see their wage rate
decreasing. Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) showed that the relation between
wage and unemployment rates is stable among countries and through time with
an elasticity around -0.1. We follow this approach (figure 3) in order to model
urban unemployment by professional categories and make the assumption that
this elasticity is not depending on the development end of the country15:
lnwuc = Dc − 0.1 lnuc (28)
15We perform a sensitivity analysis on alternative values of the wage elasticity. No substantial
changes are detected. For wage and unemployment rates, the variables of our interest, the sign
of their variation is the same as before.
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Figure 3:
where
uc is the unemployment rate of category c compatible with the corres-
ponding wage rate wuc,
Dc fixed effects related to the regions and to the industries in question,
as well as the whole characteristics of workers (age, sex, education...).
On the other hand, rural labour markets are competitive. Equilibrium occurs
when:
NATRc =
∑
ru
LRc,ru (29)
with NATRc being the rural labour supply by professional category c and LRc,ru
the labour demand of category c by rural sector ru.
4 Simulation experiments
4.0.1 A 10% drop in migration costs
We first ask how an increase in migration will impact the various segments of the
Moroccan labour market. To address this issue, we simulate the impact of a 10%
fall in migration costs mc. Such a shock can be interpreted as a translation of a
larger facility for the migrant to become operational, for example because of a fall
in migration costs, or a larger simplification and transparency of administrative
procedures, or the existence of migrants networks that facilitate integration in
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the host country.
The reduction in migration costs affects simultaneously rural and urban mi-
gration, and internal migration. We are obviously interested in the level of labour
remuneration and in the evolution of unemployment rates by professional cate-
gories.
First of all, we expect that the fall in migration costs accelerates emigra-
tion, reduces labour supply of the corresponding urban workers and their unem-
ployment rate, given that other things are equal. On the other hand, internal
migration towards cities, also facilitated by the drop in migration costs, should
increase labour supply and, ceteris paribus, the corresponding unemployment
rates. If these two migratory flows coexist, the final effect on unemployment
rates by professional categories and consequently on urban wages is ambiguous.
The results of Table 4 indicate that in the Moroccan case, the fall in labour
supply of each category due to urban emigration is more than compensated by the
increase in internal migratory flows. Thus, unemployment rates of all categories,
except for “senior executive...” and “commercants...”, increases and their wage
decreases. Unemployment rates of “farmers...” and “workmen and farm labour-
ers...” increase more (9.46% and 9.51% respectively), inducing the strongest fall
in their wages. Those of “senior executive...” and “commercants...” are dimin-
ished of 0.05% and 0.19% respectively and their wages increased. Indeed, their
labour supply increases, despite the absence of internal migration pressure on the
markets of these two categories, because urban emigration induces a rise of their
wages. Consequently, their leisure opportunity cost goes up and the correspond-
ing workers increase their labour supply NATUc. In spite of the rise in labour
supply, their unemployment rates decrease because the sector “trade and repair”
using them intensively expands and thus increases its labour demand.
Finally, only “senior executive...” and “commercants...” staying in urban areas
seem to profit from the emigration of their counterparts, which agrees with the
literature (Lucas, 1987; Lucas, 2005a)16. Migrants, whatever they were employed
or not before their departure, yield their place to workers initially not employed,
inducing a fall of unemployment and an increase in wages. On the other hand,
and contrary to what is predicted in the literature, the other urban labour cate-
gories are losing17.
16Lucas (2005a) showed that, in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, workers migra-
tion has not induced a loss of production or a rise of wages. He gave different explanations to
this stylised fact such as the possibility that those who have migrated did not have a job before
leaving. Therefore, their departure generated a fall of unemployment rate. On the other hand,
in Pakistan, workers emigration towards the Gulf countries has exerted an upper pressure on
wages. A rise of wages has also been noticed in Philippines. Lucas (1987) arrived to the same
conclusion in Mozambique and Malawi after workers emigration towards South African mines.
17Since the categories “farmers...” and “workmen and farm labourers...” constitute a negli-
gible share of urban employment, it is perfectly true to think that these workers, who migrate
massively to the cities, will change their professional category and will belong for example to
the category “warehousemen and workers of small trades”. However, given that the pressure on
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In rural areas, we observe an increase in wages because rural emigration and
migration towards the cities (facilitated by the fall in migration costs) reduce
labour supply on each rural market. Only internal migration of “workmen and
farm labourers...” decreases. This is by the drop in the expected urban wage (net
of migration costs) of this category relatively to its rural wage. But international
emigration of these workers is enough to reduce their labour supply on the corre-
sponding rural market. When labour supply diminishes, the wage rate increases
ceteris paribus, in order to reequilibrate the corresponding market. International
migratory movements and internal movements towards Moroccan cities create a
scarcity of labour on rural markets and push upward labour remunerations. On
the contrary, two forces of opposed directions are expressed on urban markets:
departure of workers towards foreign countries and internal migration from rural
to urban areas. By consequence, wage evolution is ambiguous.
Rural household welfare, mesured by the equivalent variation, increases of 37
million of dirhams, that is to say 0.042% of his initial income, because workers
staying in rural areas profit of the wage increase after the migration of their
counterparts. On the other hand, urban household welfare decreases of 16 million
of dirhams, or 0.008% of his initial income, because urban wages of the majority
of workers fall after the different types of migratory movements affecting urban
labour markets.
Table 4- Shock 1: Percentage change in wage rates, unemployment rates
and migratory flows by professional categories
Categories uc wuc wugc EMUc MIGc wrc EMRc
Directors 0.2047 −0.0205 −0.0039 2.2688 2.6029 0.0674 1.7844
Senior executive −0.0472 0.0047 0.0001 2.2501 0 0 0
Junior staff 0.1146 −0.0115 −0.0041 2.2756 2.5949 0.0674 1.7829
Employees 0.0611 −0.0061 −0.0016 2.2722 2.6008 0.0674 1.782
Commercants −0.1942 0.0194 0.0194 2.1997 0 0 0
Farmers, fishermen 9.4562 −0.8995 −0.8995 4.1045 0.2656 0.0657 1.6903
Craftsmen 0.179 −0.0179 −0.0123 2.3193 2.5416 0.0674 1.7678
Farm labourers 9.5087 −0.9042 −0.9042 4.4405 −0.1617 0.0659 1.619
Drivers 0.1627 −0.0163 −0.0095 2.3007 2.5621 0.0671 1.7689
Warehousemen 0.3731 −0.0372 −0.0206 2.4009 2.4445 0.0662 1.9331
Table 4bis- Shock 1: Absolute change in wage rates (in Moroccan
dirhams), unemployment and migration flows (in millions of working hours)
the market of “warehousemen and workers of small trades” increases with the fall of migration
costs, the reception of workers belonging to the categories “farmers...” and “workmen and farm
labourers...” will do nothing but exacerbate the pressure on this market. Thus, our contradic-
tory results with the literature on the impact of migration on unemployment are still verified.
In addition, we prefer to take into account all the professional categories existing in Morocco in
order to avoid losing information.
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Categories uc wuc wugc EMUc MIGc wrc EMRc
Directors 0.045 −0.205 −0.053 0.159 0.052 0.674 0.018
Senior executive −0.008 0.047 0.002 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.000
Junior staff 0.070 −0.115 −0.052 0.728 0.234 0.674 0.053
Employees 0.068 −0.061 −0.023 1.613 0.910 0.674 0.196
Commercants −0.062 0.194 0.194 0.814 0.000 0.000 0.000
Farmers, fishermen 0.284 −8.995 −8.995 0.164 1.363 0.657 2.620
Craftsmen 0.181 −0.179 −0.136 3.247 3.711 0.674 0.778
Farm labourers 1.902 −9.042 −9.042 0.222 −1.617 0.659 6.460
Drivers 0.138 −0.163 −0.112 0.506 0.743 0.671 0.142
Warehousemen 0.448 −0.372 −0.247 2.761 11.636 0.662 0.889
4.0.2 A 10% rise in Sub-Saharan immigrants stock
We now ask what is the impact of the South-South migration on the Moroccan
labour market. The difficulty for African countries to ameliorate the welfare of
their populations and the multiplication of conflicts let think that migratory flows
originated from Sub-Saharan Africa will not be over soon. For that, we simulate
the impact of a 10% rise in the stock of Sub-Saharan clandestine immigrants.
This surge of clandestine migrants deteriorates the situation of Moroccan urban
labour market, and can exert a pressure on the other migratory movements, those
from rural areas to the cities or to foreign countries, or urban emigration. One
can thus expect an increase in urban emigration due to the rise of unemployment
and the decrease of urban wage. Simultaneously this exit of urban workers re-
duces, at its turn, the pressure exerted by immigration on urban labour market,
and increases wages.
As one can note in Table 5, the increase in Sub-Saharan immigration creates a
pressure on urban labour market of the category “warehousemen and workers of
small trades”. This category absorbs all the entries of Sub-Saharan immigrants,
qualified or not. Given that other things are equal, the unemployment rate of
this category increases and induces ceteris paribus a fall of its urban wage. Mo-
roccan urban workers belonging to the same category are thus incited to leave
the country whereas rural workers are incited to stay in rural areas. Let us notice
however that in the Moroccan case, the fall of internal migration and the rise of
urban emigration do not compensate the entry of african immigrants. Indeed,
the unemployment rate of this category of workers increases by 0.72% and their
urban wage decreases.
This wage variation also induces indirect effects on total labour demand by
firms, and the latter will be reflected on the other urban markets. Thus, urban
sectors increase their demand of “warehousemen and workers of small trades”
whose wage goes downward (nationals and foreign in the same proportion). The
production of sectors intensive in this category rises (especially mining, textile,
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clothing and chemical industries, construction services, hotels and restaurants,
transport and telecommunication that are the most intensive in this type of
labour). Given that capital is sectoral specific, the increase in production should
induce, on its turn, a rise of labour demand of the other categories, reduce their
unemployment rates and increase their urban wages. This is the case of all cate-
gories except “farmers...”, “craftsmen and artisanal trades qualified workers...”,
“workmen and farm labourers...” and “drivers and assembly workers...”. Let us
examine now rural wages evolution that affects the decision to migrate towards
the cities and consequently the urban labour supply of the other categories.
Given that other things are equal, the nominal exchange rate depreciation
(which increases the value of the foreign wage in local currency) should motivate
rural workers of all categories to migrate. At constant rural population, this
should induce a fall in Moroccan population wishing to stay in its country and
consequently a reduction in labour supply on the different rural markets. Since
these markets are competitive, rural wages will rise. Therefore, workers remain-
ing in rural zones and belonging to the categories “farmers...” and “workmen
and farm labourers...” revise downward their decision to emigrate because the
wage increase compensates the stimulating effect of exchange rate depreciation.
Urban emigration, also motivated by nominal exchange rate depreciation, and
the decrease of internal migration towards the cities after the rise of rural wages
reduce labour supply of all professional categories (except “commercants...”).
Thus unemployment rates of all categories except “drivers and assembly work-
ers” decrease and the corresponding wages increase. The unemployment rate of
“commercants...” also decreases because the rise of demand for this type of work-
ers is stronger than the rise of the corresponding labour supply. On the other
hand, the fall in labour demand of “drivers and assembly workers” is stronger
than the fall in their labour supply, and thus their unemployment rate increases.
The reason why labour demand of “drivers and assembly workers” decreases is
that the production of the sectors “machines and equipment manufacturing”,
“radio and TV equipment” and “car industry” goes down after the fall in total
internal demand addressed to them. Let us note finally that urban emigration
of “commercants...”, “farmers...” and “workmen and farm labourers...” decreases
because the nominal exchange rate depreciation does not compensate the rise of
the average urban wage by professional categories.
We have just seen how the entry of workers on a specific urban labour mar-
ket supports the emigration of the corresponding workers. However, emigration
does not succeed to reduce the pressure on this market. Moreover, this entry of
workers induces indirectly a variation in migratory flows on the other markets
via wages variation.
The positive evolution of urban wages of the majority of categories induces a
rise in urban household labour remuneration, and ceteris paribus, a rise in their
total income. Therefore, their welfare measured by the equivalent variation, in-
creases of 10 million dirhams, or 0.005% of their initial income. In the same way,
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the rise of rural wages of all professional categories gives place to an increase in
rural household income and to an improvement of his welfare. His equivalent
variation is of 5 million dirhams, or 0.006% of his initial income.
The growth impact, measured by the variation of real GNP, is positive (a rise
of 0.002%) and it is mainly due to the expansion of sectoral production. Indeed,
in spite of the rise in urban private wage of the majority of categories, the firms
in all sectors (except “machines and equipment manufacturing”, “radio and TV
equipment” and “car industry”) benefit from the increase in consumers demand
in order to rise their production. Moreover, since any increase in interior demand
is satisfied by domestic and imported, total imports volume increases. Since
current surplus should be maintained fixed, the real exchange rate depreciates in
order to promote exports. Total trade volume is finally increased.
Table 5- Shock 2: Percentage change in wage rates, unemployment rates
and migratory flows by professional categories
Categories uc wuc wugc EMUc MIGc wrc EMRc
Directors −0.0156 0.0016 0.0002 0.0047 −0.023 0.0097 0.0026
Senior executive −0.0667 0.0067 0.0006 0.0023 0 0 0
Junior staff −0.0053 0.0005 0.0002 0.0047 −0.0231 0.0097 0.0028
Employees −0.0171 0.0017 −0.0002 0.0014 −0.0197 0.0097 0.0031
Commercants −0.0942 0.0094 0.0094 −0.0189 0 0 0
Farmers, fishermen −0.0419 0.0042 0.0042 −0.0021 −0.0189 0.0117 −0.0132
Craftsmen −0.002 0.0002 0.0002 0.005 −0.0235 0.0097 0.0018
Farm labourers −0.0541 0.0054 0.0054 −0.0062 −0.0126 0.0114 −0.0129
Drivers 0.0024 −0.0002 0 0.0064 −0.0259 0.01 0.0016
Warehousemen 0.7196 −0.0717 −0.0427 0.2879 −0.3793 0.0111 0.0195
Table 5bis- Shock 2: Absolute change in wage rates (in Moroccan
dirhams), unemployment and migration flows (in millions of working hours)
Categories uc wuc wugc EMUc MIGc wrc EMRc
Directors −0.003 0.016 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.097 0.000
Senior executive −0.011 0.067 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Junior staff −0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002 −0.002 0.097 0.000
Employees −0.019 0.017 −0.003 0.001 −0.007 0.097 0.000
Commercants −0.030 0.094 0.094 −0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
Farmers, fishermen −0.001 0.042 0.042 0.000 −0.097 0.117 −0.020
Craftsmen −0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 −0.034 0.097 0.001
Farm labourers −0.011 0.054 0.054 0.000 −0.126 0.114 −0.052
Drivers 0.002 −0.002 0.000 0.001 −0.008 0.100 0.000
Warehousemen 0.864 −0.717 −0.513 0.331 −1.806 0.111 0.009
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4.0.3 The simultaneous impact of a 10% drop in migration costs and
a 10% rise in Sub-Saharan immigrants stock
We must now consider an experiment reflecting the actual shocks to the Moroc-
can labour market, containing the two previous elements. Since the two previous
shocks induce a greater pressure on the labour market of “warehousemen and
workers of small trades”, their simultaneous effect consists, as expected, in a
stronger rise of unemployment (of 1.09% against 0.37% and 0.72% respectively
during the first and second shocks18). Since the unemployment rate of this cat-
egory rises more, the corresponding urban wage falls more and urban sectors
express a stronger labour demand of this category. Given that other things are
equal, sectors intensive in this type of labour expand more (especially mining,
textile, clothing, and chemical industries, construction services, hotels and restau-
rants, transports and telecommunication). These sectors will also require more
workers belonging to the other categories, and this could reduce the pressure
exerted by internal migration on some labour markets. We notice that the rise
of labour demand of “directors...”, “employees”, “farmers...” and “workmen and
farm labourers...”, and the increase in urban emigration flows, reduce the pres-
sure exerted by internal migration but do not succeed to reduce unemployment
rates of the previous categories. They evoluate positively but their variation is
less than the one resulting from the first shock (i.e. the reduction in migration
costs). In the same way, the increase in the unemployment rate of “junior staff”
and “drivers and assembly workers” is reduced because the raise of Sub-Saharan
immigration induced indirectly a drop in their labour supply and thus a decline in
their unemployment rates. On the other hand, the rise of labour demand and ur-
ban emigration of the “senior executive...” and “commercants...” cause a stronger
fall of their unemployment rates. All urban wage rates vary in the opposite sign
of unemployment rates.
Rural wages increase more under the simultaneous effect of the drop in mi-
gration costs and the increase in Sub-Saharan immigration: indeed, the fall in
migration costs stimulates rural emigration (direct effect) and Sub-Saharan im-
migration induces indirectly an exchange rate depreciation favorable to rural
emigration (indirect effect).
The positive evolution of rural household equivalent variation is accentuated
with respect to the previous shocks due to the higher rise of rural wages acting
on rural household income. Welfare is improved of 42 million dirhams (against
37 millions and 5 millions before), that is to say 0.047% of his initial income.
For urban household, the deterioration of welfare at the first shock is reduced
because his welfare improves during the second shock. It ends up decreasing of 6
million dirhams (instead of 16 millions during first shock), or 0.003% of his initial
18Since the evolution of most variables in the last simulation is generally the sum of the
variations of the same variable in the two previous shocks, one could think of a shock linearity.
However, we can show that this is mainly due to the weak intensity of the selected shocks: a
stronger fall of migration costs is sufficient to eliminate the apparent linearity.
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income.
Table 6- Shock 3: Percentage change in wage rates, unemployment rates
and migratory flows by professional categories
Categories uc wuc wugc EMUc MIGc wrc EMRc
Directors 0.1892 −0.0189 −0.0036 2.2735 2.5795 0.0771 1.787
Senior executive −0.1135 0.0114 0.0008 2.2524 0 0 0
Junior staff 0.1094 −0.0109 −0.0039 2.2804 2.5714 0.0771 1.7857
Employees 0.0441 −0.0044 −0.0018 2.2737 2.5808 0.0771 1.7851
Commercants −0.2877 0.0288 0.0288 2.1805 0 0 0
Farmers, fishermen 9.4105 −0.8953 −0.8953 4.1023 0.2469 0.0773 1.677
Craftsmen 0.177 −0.0177 −0.0121 2.3244 2.5176 0.0771 1.7696
Farm labourers 9.4508 −0.899 −0.899 4.434 −0.1742 0.0773 1.6059
Drivers 0.1651 −0.0165 −0.0096 2.3072 2.5357 0.0771 1.7705
Warehousemen 1.0917 −0.1085 −0.063 2.6951 2.0568 0.0772 1.9516
Table 6bis- Shock 3: Absolute change in wage rates (in Moroccan
dirhams), unemployment and migration flows (in millions of working hours)
Categories uc wuc wugc EMUc MIGc wrc EMRc
Directors 0.042 −0.189 −0.050 0.159 0.052 0.771 0.018
Senior executive −0.019 0.114 0.011 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.000
Junior staff 0.067 −0.109 −0.049 0.730 0.231 0.771 0.054
Employees 0.049 −0.044 −0.026 1.614 0.903 0.771 0.196
Commercants −0.092 0.288 0.288 0.807 0.000 0.000 0.000
Farmers, fishermen 0.282 −8.953 −8.953 0.164 1.266 0.773 2.599
Craftsmen 0.179 −0.177 −0.134 3.254 3.676 0.771 0.779
Farm labourers 1.890 −8.990 −8.990 0.222 −1.742 0.773 6.408
Drivers 0.140 −0.165 −0.113 0.508 0.735 0.771 0.142
Warehousemen 1.310 −1.085 −0.757 3.099 9.790 0.772 0.898
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we are interested in a particular shutter of the relation between
migration and economic development of the sending country. We paid attention
to the relation between migration and unemployment by professional categories,
which is little exploited in the literature. Moreover, all the proposed analysis
do not treat, to our knowledge, more than one type of migratory flow (partic-
ularly emigration from the country of origin). The originality of our work is to
take simultaneously into account three types of migratory flows characterising
a country having a long history with migration: Morocco. The following flows
are considered: rural and urban emigration, internal migration towards the cities
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and Sub-Saharan immigration (towards Moroccan cities). Each one of these mi-
gratory flows has different effects on urban labour market and does not affect
equally all the professional categories. Urban emigration reduces unemployment
rates and increases wages. On the other hand, Sub-Saharan immigration and
internal migration increase unemployment rates and reduce wages. If these flows
coexist, the final effect on unemployment and wage rates is ambiguous: this is
the interest of our analysis.
Our results obtained from a CGE model of the Moroccan economy, calibrated
on the SAM of the year 1998, attests to the expected ambiguity of the impact of
these three migratory flows on wage and unemployment rates. In the first simula-
tion where migration costs decrease, the increase in internal migration upsets the
expected effects associated to urban emigration, such as the fall in unemployment
and the rise in wage rate. In the second simulation, Sub-Saharan immigration
affects indirectly the urban labour market of the other categories, by modifying
their unemployment rates, wages and emigration flows. But the variation of em-
igration induced by the exchange rate depreciation does not lead to the expected
effects on unemployment rates of all the professions because it is thwarted by
the evolution of the other variables in the model. In the third simulation, we
run simultaneously the two previous shocks since they will coexist in the future
and will lead to different results. The effects on unemployment and wage rates
of urban emigration do not correspond, once again, to what is awaited, because
of the existence of other migratory flows affecting urban labour market.
Currently, the debates on migration evoke that a good management of migra-
tory policies can generate important profits to the sending and receiving countries.
The results of migration impact on Morocco show that it is dangerous to set up
migratory policies without having a global vision of all migratory flows existing
and the way in which they affect labour market and the remainder of the econ-
omy. In particular, we saw that the expected effect of urban emigration can be
upset by the impact of another flow entering urban labour market. By compar-
ing the three previous scenarios, we find that a rise of Sub-Saharan immigration
is not such harmful to welfare. Urban household welfare is largely improved. It
becomes positive. On the other hand, the amelioration of rural household welfare
is reduced. In addition, the last scenario is the best in terms of welfare for rural
household.
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APPENDIX 1
DATA
The social accounting matrix (SAM) constitutes the empirical database re-
quired to satisfy the accounting coherence of a CGE model. We use the Moroccan
SAM built by Touhami Abdelkhalek and Nouzha Zaoujal (2003) for the year 1998
from several Moroccan data sources: the Input-Output tables of the Moroccan
economy for 1998, built by the Direction of Statistics and published, in a pre-
liminary version, in 2002, the National Survey on Households Living Standards
in 1998-1999 (NSHLS) of 1998-99 carried out by the Direction of Statistics, doc-
uments from the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, from External Trade
department, from the Ministry of Agriculture, from Foreign Exchange depart-
ment, and from Bank Al-Maghrib. The SAM gathers two factors of production
(work and capital), four types of agents (Households, Firms, Government, the
Rest of the World), 34 sectors of activity that correspond exactly to those of the
Input-Output tables of the Moroccan economy in 1998.
In order to distinguish between rural and urban areas, we need to take into
consideration two types of households and two types of production factors, rural
labour offered by rural household and urban labour offered by urban household.
All household accounts must be adjusted in order to distinguish, from now on,
between two representative households:
1- The submatrix of transfers is distributed between the two households according
to weights calculated essentially from the Moroccan SAM built for the IMMPA19
project of the World Bank.
2- Labour remuneration going to rural household comes only from rural labour
and the one going to urban household comes only from urban labour.
3- The NSHLS of 2001 provides percentages on the distribution of total con-
sumption between rural and urban households. These percentages are respec-
tively around 0.3% and 0.7% of total households consumption. In addition, the
NSHLS publishes percentages on the distribution of rural and urban households
consumption between the different aggregated sectors of activity. From these
percentages, different calculations are made in order to quantify the distribution
of rural and urban households consumption according to the 34 sectors of the
Input-Output table.
4- According to the NSHLS of 2001, the distribution of of consumption expendi-
tures would be a good approximation of the distribution of total income between
rural and urban households. Thus, we suppose that rural household income con-
stitutes 0.3% of households total income and urban household income constitutes
0.7% of households total income.
19Integrated Macroeconomic Model for Poverty Analysis.
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The distinction between rural and urban areas should also be done in terms of
production. The agricultural and fishing sectors are supposed to constitute the
rural sector, and all the remaining sectors, including the public ones, are supposed
to form the urban sector. Indeed, as we have just seen in section 2, agriculture
absorb 80.2% of rural employment, industry and services absorb 77.5% of urban
employment and the public sector employs especially townsmen, that is 17.3% of
total employment in the cities against only 1.9% in the campaigns.
Rural employment, given in terms of our matrix by the sum of labour demand
by the agricultural and fishing sectors is around 3,166 workers. On the other hand,
urban sectors employ 103,996 workers. This implies that rural employment is not
more than 3% of total employment whereas in reality, it corresponds to the half of
national employment. According to Harrison et al. (2003), capital remuneration
is overestimated in the agricultural sector because it is calculated residually from
the production value after deducing labour remuneration and the cost of interme-
diary consumption. However, the agricultural sector uses generally family work
and informal labour that are not computed in input-output tables. Therefore,
given that agricultural work is underestimates, capital remuneration is overesti-
mated. This is why agricultural and fishing sectors seem to be capital intensive
whereas they should be labour intensive. The basic SAM should be adjusted in
order to to make rural sectors labour intensive while having a positive (although
weak) capital demand. All necessary adjustments being made, our rural employ-
ment is around 37% of total employment.
We further desaggregate our SAM in order to take into account several pro-
fessional categories. There is ten professional categories listed in Morocco. These
categories exist in urban and rural areas. We then find ourselves with 20 labour
markets. We use the national survey of the Direction of Statistics on activity,
employment and unemployment in 1999 in order to distribute rural and urban
employment between professional categories. The only difference is that we as-
sume that there is no “commercants...” in rural areas because they work primarily
in trade services that belong to the urban sector and are consumed as interme-
diary inputs by the rural sector.
Finally, since we analyse the impact of migration on labour market, we need
data on Morrocan emigration towards foreign countries, on rural-urban migration
and on Sub-Saharan immigration:
1- For lack of data on Morrocan emigration, we resort to the data published by
the OECD in 2006 on immigrants inflows by nationality in some OECD countries.
More specifically, we approximate Moroccan emigration by the flows of Moroccan
migrants to their traditional destinations in 1999, such as Belgium, France, Italy,
the Netherlands and Spain. The sum of these flows is reported to the Moroccan
working population of 1999 in order to calculate the annual percentage of emi-
grants.
2- According to a report of the International Organization of Migration, Moroc-
can emigration towards European countries is more originated from rural areas.
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We suppose that 60% of the national emigration flow take place from rural areas
and 40% from urban areas.
3- Age´nor et al. (2003) point out that each year, around 200,000 workers migrate
from rural to urban areas. This corresponds approximately to 3.7% of the rural
working population of 1999.
4- Data collection on African immigrants to Morocco is the most difficult task
because the majority of immigrants are clandestine. According to Lahlou (2003),
there would be between 6,000 and 15,000 clandestine immigrants, but these esti-
mates are uncertain. We retain the upper bound. This number is reported to the
urban working population of 1999 in order to calculate the stock of immigrants
corresponding to our matrix.
5- Finally, for lack of data on migration by professional categories, we suppose
that the number of rural/urban migrants belonging to a professional category is
proportional to the share of this category in rural/urban total employment.
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APPENDIX 2
ABBREVIATION OF SECTORS AND PROFESSIONAL CATEGORIES
Sectors
SA subsistence agriculture
IA industrial agriculture
MII mining industry
FOO food industry
TOB tobacco industry
TEX textile industry
CLO clothing industry
LEA leather and shoes industry
WOO fabrication of wood and wood-based products
PAP paper industry
EDI edition, printing and reproduction
OIL oil refining
CHE chemical industry
RUB rubber and plastic industry
MIN manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
MET metallurgy
MEP metal processing
MAC machines and equipment manufacturing
OFF office machinery
RAD radio and TV equipment
MED medical instruments manufacturing
CAR car industry
TRM manufacture of other transport means
FUR furniture manufacturing, other industries
ELE electricity and water - production and distribution
CON construction
TRR trade and repair
HOT hotels and restaurants
TRA transports and telecommunication
FIN financial activities and insurance
REN rental services
ADM public administration and social security
EDU education ad health
SER other non financial services
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Professional categories
1 directors
2 senior executive and members of liberal professions
3 junior staff
4 employees
5 commercants, commercial and financial intermediaries
6 farmers, fishermen, foresters, hunters and workers assimilate
7 craftsmen and artisanal trades qualified workers (farm labourers excluded)
8 workmen and farm labourers (including skilled workers)
9 drivers and assembly workers
10 warehousemen and workers of small trades
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APPENDIX 3
EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL
Notations
i and j refers to sectors, ps and pub to private and public sectors respectively, up
and ru to urban and rural private sectors, tr and ntr to tradable and non tradable
sectors, ag to agents, da to domestic agents, h to households and c to professional
categories. cm1 is the set of professional categories c excluding category n◦ 10.
Parameters definition
Aps Scale parameter of the value added CES function
αps Share parameter of this function
σps Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital
a Parameter in the value added function of subsistence agriculture
b Parameter in the value added function of subsistence agriculture
f Parameter in the value added function of subsistence agriculture
Bps Scale parameter of the Cobb-Douglas function of labour in sector ps
ωc,ps Share of category c in total labour demand by sector ps
Aiup Scale parameter of the CES function of imperfect substitutability between
domestic workers and immigrants
Ωup Share parameter of this function
ςup Elasticity of substitution between domestic workers and immigrants
kpub Capital share in public value added (Leontief)
lcc,pub Share of category c in total labour demand (Leontief) by the public sector
ioj Share of intermediary consumption in the production (Leontief) of sector j
vj Share of value added in the production (Leontief) of sector j
aiji,j Intermediary consumption of good i by unity of production of sector j
txj Indirect taxes on sector j products
tmtr Import tariff rate on product tr
tetr Export tariff rate on product tr
tyh Direct tax rate on household h income
tye Direct tax rate on firms income
Brc Scale parameter of the CET function of the rural population
$c Share parameter of this function
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εc Elasticity of international migration from rural areas
Buc Scale parameter of the CET function of the rural population that decides to
stay in Morocco
ϑc Share parameter of this function
%c Elasticity of migration from rural to urban areas
Bic Scale parameter of the CET function of the urban population
ξc Share parameter of this function
oc Elasticity of international migration from urban areas
Betr Scale parameter of the CET production function
δtr Share parameter of this function
κtr Transformation elasticity (CET production function)
ϕtr Price elasticity of export demand
Amtr Scale parameter of the Armington CES function
θtr Share parameter of this function
χtr Substitution elasticity (Armington function)
γi,h Budgetary share of good i in the supernumerary income of household h
βc Leisure share in rural household member c income
β′c Leisure share in urban household member c income
lsmaxc Maximal number of working hours offered by rural worker c
lsmax′c Maximal number of working hours offered by urban worker c
λc Share of member c in rural household non-labour income
λ′c Share of member c in urban household non-labour income
µi Share of product i in total investment
θj Share of sector j value added in GDP at factor cost
ψh Household h propensity to save
ηag Share of capital remuneration received by agent ag
φag Share of labour remuneration received by agent ag
Dc Scale parameter of the wage curve
mc Migration costs
cs Social security contributions
Variables definition
Endogenous variables
a) Prices
wj Average wage rate of sector j
wrc Rural wage rate of professional category c
wuc Wage rate of category c in the urban private sector
wgc Wage rate of category c in the urban public sector
wic International wage rate of category c in foreign currency
wnc National wage rate of category c
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wugc Average urban wage rate of category c
wupup Average wage of category “10” in private urban sector up
wac Expected urban wage of category c
rj Capital return in sector j
PVj Value added price of sector j
PLj Producer price of sector j product sold on the domestic market
PDj Market price of sector j local product sold on the domestic market
Pj Production price on factor cost of sector j
PCj Market price of the composite good belonging to sector j
Pwmtr International import price of the product belonging to sector tr, in
foreign currency
Pwetr International export price of the product belonging to sector tr, in
foreign currency
PMtr Domestic price of the imported good tr
PEtr Producer price of the exported good tr
Pfobtr Fob price of the exported good tr
PINV Aggregate price of investment
Plrc Leisure price of rural household member c
P luc Leisure price of urban household member c
e Nominal exchange rate (the price of a unity of foreign currency in
domestic currency)
Pindex GDP deflator, nume´raire
b) Production
XSj Production of sector j
V Aj Value added of sector j
DIi,j Intermediary demand of product i by sector j
CIj Total intermediary consumption of sector j
c) Factors of production
KDj Capital demand by sector j
LDRru Labour demand by rural sector ru
LRc,ru Labour demand of category c by rural sector ru
LDUup Labour demand by urban private sector up
LUc,up Labour demand of category c by urban private sector up
LDGpub Labour demand by public sector pub
LGc,pub Labour demand of category c by urban public sector pub
LSRc Rural population belonging to category c
LSUc Urban population belonging to category c
uc Urban unemployment rate of category c
d) Migration
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NATc Moroccan rural workers of category c having decided to stay
in Morocco
EMRc Moroccan rural emigrants flow of category c
NATRc Moroccan rural workers of category c having decided to stay in
rural areas
MIGc Moroccan rural migrants flow of category c towards urban areas
NATUc Moroccan urban workers of category c having decided to stay in
urban areas
EMUc Moroccan urban emigrants flow of category c
IMMIGc Sub-Saharan immigrants stock of category c
NATIup Demand of national workers of category “10” by urban private
sector up
ETRup Demand of Sub-Saharan immigrants of category “10” by urban
private sector up
e) Income/Savings
Yag Agent ag income
Y Dh Disposable income of household h
Sag Agent ag savings
Tag,ag Transfers between agents
f) Tax revenues
TIj Indirect taxes on products belonging to sector j
TIMtr Import tariffs on imported products tr
TIEtr Export tariffs on exported products tr
adj Compensatory tax
g) External trade
EXStr Export supply of product tr
DOMj Domestic production of sector j sold on the domestic market
Qj Supply of composite product belonging to sector j
EXDtr Export supply of product tr
Mtr Import demand of product tr
h) Final demand
CTi,h Consumption of good i by household h
CMINi,h Minimum consumption of good i by household h
BCh Consumption budget of household h
IBCc,h Consumption budget of member c belonging to household h
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Gi Public consumption of product i
DITi Total intermediary consumption of product i
INVi Investment demand of product i
STKi Stock variation of product i
ITV OL Gross fixed capital formation (volume)
IT Gross fixed capital formation (value)
Exogenous variables
wgc Wage rate of category c in the urban public sector
wic International wage rate of category c in foreign currency
rpub Capital return of public sector pub
LDGpub Labour demand by public sector pub
KDps Capital demand by sector ps
Pwmtr International import price of products belonging to sector tr,
in foreign currency
Pwetr International export price of products belonging to sector tr,
in foreign currency
IMMIGc Sub-Saharan immigrants stock of category c
CMINi,h Minimum consumption of product i by household h
Gi Public consumption of product i
STKi Stock variation of product i
ITV OL Gross fixed capital formation (volume)
S“row” External savings
Th,ag Transfers by agent ag to household h
T“fm”,ag Transfers by agent ag to firms
T“row”,ag Transfers by agent ag to the Rest of the World
T“gv”,“gv” Transfers made by the government to itself
T“gv”,“row” Transfers by the Rest of the World to the government
Pindex GDP deflator, nume´raire
Equations of the model
Rural sector
XSru = V Aru/vru (A1)
CIru = ioruXSru (A2)
DIi,ru = aiji,ruCIru (A3)
V A“av” = a(1− e−(LDR“av”/b)f ) (A4)
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V A“ar” = A“ar”[α“ar”LDR
(σ“ar”−1)/σ“ar”
“ar” + (1− α“ar”)KD(σ“ar”−1)/σ“ar”“ar” ]σ“ar”/(σ“ar”−1)(A5)
LDR“av” =
PV“av”V A“av”
w“av”
(A6)
LDR“ar”/KD“ar” = (
α“ar”
1− α“ar”
r“ar”
w“ar”
)σ“ar” (A7)
LDRru = Bru
∏
c
LRc,ru
ωc,ru (A8)
LRc,“av” =
ωc,“av”LDR“av”w“av”
wrc
(A9)
LRc,“ar” =
ωc,“ar”LDR“ar”w“ar”
wrc(1 + cs)
(A10)
NATRc = lsmaxc − βc(1− βc)prlc (IBCc,“hr” − λc
∑
i
PCiCMINi,“hr”) (A11)
Urban private sector
XSup = V Aup/vup (A12)
CIup = ioupXSup (A13)
DIi,up = aiji,upCIup (A14)
V Aup = Aup[αupLDU
(σup−1)/σup
up + (1− αup)KD(σup−1)/σupup ]σup/(σup−1) (A15)
LDUup/KDup = (
αup
1− αup
rup
wup
)σup (A16)
LDUup = Bup
∏
c
LUc,up
ωc,up (A17)
LUcm1,up =
ωcm1,upLDUupwup
(1 + cs)wuc
(A18)
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LU“10”,up =
ω“10”,upLDUupwup
wupup
(A19)
LU“10”,up = Aiup[ΩupNATI
(ςup−1)/ςup
up + (1− Ωup)ETR(ςup−1)/ςupup ]ςup/(ςup−1)(A20)
ETRup
NATIup
= (
1− Ωup
Ωup
wu“10”(1 + cs)
wu“10”
)ςup (A21)
NATUc = lsmax′c −
β′c
(1− β′c)pluc
(IBCc,“hu” − λ′c
∑
i
PCiCMINi,“hu”) (A22)
Public sector
XSpub = V Apub/vpub (A23)
CIpub = iopubXSpub (A24)
DIi,pub = aiji,pubCIpub (A25)
V Apub = KDpub/kpub (A26)
LGc,pub = LDGpublcc,pub (A27)
KDpub =
PVpubV Apub − wpubLDGpub
rpub
(A28)
Migratory flows
LSRc = Brc[$cNAT (εc−1)/εcc + (1−$c)EMR(εc−1)/εcc ]εc/(εc−1) (A29)
EMRc
NATc
= (
$c
1−$c
wice(1−mc)
wnc
)−εc (A30)
NATc = Buc[ϑcNATR(%c−1)/%cc + (1− ϑc)MIG(%c−1)/%cc ]%c/(%c−1) (A31)
MIGc
NATRc
= (
ϑc
1− ϑc
wac(1−mc)
wrc
)−%c (A32)
LSUc = Bic[ξcNATU (oc−1)/occ + (1− ξc)EMU (oc−1)/occ ]oc/(oc−1)
EMUc
NATUc
= (
ξc
1− ξc
wice(1−mc)
wac
)−oc (A33)
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Income/Savings of households and firms
Y“hr” =
∑
ru
(
∑
c
wrcLRc,ru) + η“hr”
∑
j
rjKDj +
∑
ag
T“hr”,ag (A34)
Y“hu” = (1− φrow)[
∑
up
(
∑
c
wucLUc,up) +∑
pub
(
∑
c
wgcLGc,pub)] + η“hu”
∑
j
rjKDj +
∑
ag
T“hu”,ag (A35)
Y“fm” = (1− η“hr” − η“hu” − η“gv” − η“row”)
∑
j
rjKDj +
∑
ag
T“fm”,ag (A36)
Y D“hr” = Y“hr”(1− ty“hr” × adj)−
(T“hr”,“hr” + T“hu”,“hr” + T“fm”,“hr” + T“row”,“hr”) (A37)
Y D“hu” = Y“hu”(1− ty“hu” × adj)−
(T“hr”,“hu” + T“hu”,“hu” + T“fm”,“hu” + T“row”,“hu”) (A38)
Sh = ψhY Dh (A39)
BCh = Y Dh − Sh (A40)
S“fm” = Y“fm” −
∑
ag
Tag,“fm” (A41)
Government receipts and expenditures
TItr = txtr(PtrXStr − PEtrEXStr) + txtr(1 + tmtr)ePmwtrMtr (A42)
TIntr = txntrPLntrXSntr (A43)
TIMtr = tmtrePwmtrMtr (A44)
TIEtr = tetrPEtrEXStr (A45)
T“gv”,h = (tyh × adj)Yh (A46)
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T“gv”,“fm” = tyeY“fm” (A47)
Y“gv” = η“gv”
∑
j
rjKDj +
∑
tr
TIMtr +
∑
tr
TIEtr +
∑
j
TIj +
∑
ag
T“gv”,ag +
(
∑
up
wupLDUup −
∑
up
(
∑
c
wucLUc,up)) + (w“ar”LDR“ar” −
∑
c
wrcLRc,“ar”))(A48)
S“gv” = Y“gv” −
∑
i
PCiGi −
∑
ag
Tag,“gv” (A49)
External Trade
XStr = Betr[δtrEXS
(κtr−1)/κtr
tr + (1− δtr)DOM (κtr−1)/κtrtr ]κtr/(κtr−1) (A50)
XSntr = DOMntr (A51)
EXStr
DOMtr
= (
δtr
1− δtr
PLtr
PEtr
)κtr (A52)
EXDtr = EXDOtr(
Pwetr
Pfobtr
)ϕtr (A53)
Qtr = Amtr[θtrM
(χtr−1)/χtr
tr + (1− θtr)DOM (χtr−1)/χtrtr ]χtr/(χtr−1) (A54)
Qntr = DOMntr (A55)
Mtr
DOMtr
= (
θtr
1− θtr
PDtr
PMtr
)χtr (A56)
S“row” =
∑
tr
PwmtrMtr + φrow
∑
up(
∑
cwucLUc,up) +
∑
pub(
∑
cwgcLGc,pub)
e
+η“row”
∑
j rjKDj
e
+
∑
ag T“row”,ag
e
(A57)
−
∑
tr
PfobtrEXStr −
∑
ag Tag,row
e
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Final demand
CTi,“hr” = CMINi,“hr” +
γi,“hr”
PCi
(BC“hr” −
∑
i
PCiCMINi,“hr”) (A58)
CTi,“hu” = CMINi,“hu” +
γi,“hu”
PCi
(BC“hu” −
∑
i
PCiCMINi,“hu”) (A59)
IBCc,“hr” = (1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr” × adj)wrc
∑
ru
LRc,ru + (A60)
λc(1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr” × adj)[Y“hr” −
∑
c
(wrc
∑
ru
LRc,ru)]
IBCc,“hu” = (1− ψ“hu”)(1− ty“hu” × adj)(wuc
∑
up
LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub
LGc,pub) (A61)
+λ′c(1− ψ“hu”)(1− ty“hu” × adj)[Y“hu” −
∑
c
(wuc
∑
up
LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub
LGc,pub)]
INVi = µiIT/PCi (A62)
DITi =
∑
i
aiji,jCIj (A63)
Prices
lnwuc
Pindex
= Dc − 0.1 lnuc (A64)
wgc  wuc (A65)
wnc =
wrc
∑
ru LRc,ru + wuc
∑
up LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub LGc,pub∑
ru LRc,ru +
∑
up LUc,up +
∑
pub LGc,pub
(A66)
wugc =
wuc
∑
up LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub LGc,pub∑
up LUc,up +
∑
pub LGc,pub
(A67)
wpub =
∑
c
wgcLGc,pub
LDGpub
(A68)
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wac = wugc
∑
up LUc,up +
∑
pub LGc,pub
NATUc + (1−mc)MIGc + IMMIGc (A69)
wupup =
(1 + cs)wu“10”NATIup + wu“10”ETRup
LU“10”,up
(A70)
r“ar” =
PV“ar”V A“ar” − w“ar”LDR“ar”
KD“ar”
(A71)
rup =
PVupV Aup − wupLDUup
KDup
(A72)
PVj =
PjXSj −
∑
i PCiDIi,j
V Aj
(A73)
PMtr = ePwmtr(1 + tmtr)(1 + txtr) (A74)
PEtr =
ePfobtr
(1 + tetr)
(A75)
PCtr =
DOMtrPDtr +MtrPMtr
Qtr
(A76)
PCntr = PDntr (A77)
PDj = PLj(1 + txj) (A78)
Ptr =
PLtrDOMtr + PEtrEXStr
XStr
(A79)
Pntr = PLntr (A80)
PINV =
∏
i
(
PCi
µi
)
µi
(A81)
Plrc = (1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr” × adj)wrc (A82)
Pluc = (1− ψ“hu”)(1− ty“hu” × adj)(1− uc)wugc (A83)
Pindex =
∑
j
θjPVj (A84)
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Equilibrium conditions
NATRc =
∑
ru
LRc,ru (A85)
(NATUc + (1−mc)MIGc + IMMIGc)(1− uc) =
∑
up
LUc,up +
∑
pub
LGc,pub(A86)
Qi = Gi +DITi +
∑
h
CTi,h + INVi + STKi (A87)
EXStr = EXDtr (A88)
ITV OL = IT/PINV (A89)
IT +
∑
i
STKiPCi =
∑
da
Sda + eS”row” (A90)
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